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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

MARION MARSH,

Appeal No. 970696-CA
Civil No. 894891070-DA

Petitioner/Appellee,
:
-vs:

Priority No. 15

SCOTT ALLAN MARSH,
Respondent/Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS PRESIDING
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over
this appeal pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN,

§

78-2A-3(2)

(h) (1953 as

amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Appellee

was entitled to a portion of Appellant's military separation pay
where Appellee was awarded a portion of Appellant's possible
military retirement benefits in the Divorce Decree, and at the
time Appellee was awarded a portion of the separation pay,
Appellant had earned a longevity pension.
In reviewing a modification of a divorce decree, "[t]rial

1

courts have considerable discretion to adjust divorcing parties'
financial and property interests."'

Throckmorton v. Throckmorton,

767 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742
P.2d 123, 124 (Utah App. 1987)).

"The discretionary power to

fashion an equitable property division extends equally to
subsequent modifications of an earlier decree."

Id. (citing

McCrary v. McCrarv, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979)).

"Moreover,

the trial court's actions are entitled to a presumption of
validity."

Id. (citing Ruhsam, 742 P.2d at 124).

"Absent a

showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, [the
Appellate Court] will not interfere with an alimony or property
award."

16^

(citing Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078

(Utah 1988); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App. 1987)).
2.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Appellee

was not in contempt where the Decree of Divorce ordered Appellant
to pay child support and alimony and ordered Appellee to hold
Appellant harmless on a home mortgage, and Appellant
intentionally refused to pay support and was over $7,000.00 in
arrears, and the mortgage was foreclosed due to Appellee's
inability to pay the mortgage because of Appellant's refusal to
pay support.
"[T]he generally accepted rule is that the issuance of an
order relating to contempt of court, or the holding of a party in
contempt of court, are matters which are not mandatory upon the

2

trial judge, but rest within his sound discretion."

Bartholomew

v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 1976)(citations omitted).
"In the absence of any action in that regard which is so
unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or
a clear abuse of his discretion, this court on review would not
disagree with his determination and compel such an action."

Id.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The determinative provisions for this appeal are 10 U.S.C.
§§ 627-1174 and § 1408 (See Exhibit "A", Aplt. Brief) which
govern military separation pay and pension and retirement
benefits.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal arises from a Decree of Divorce and subsequent
motions and petition.

The parties to this action were married

for approximately fifteen years.

The Decree awarded Appellee a

portion of Appellant's military retirement benefits and ordered
Appellant to pay child support and alimony to Appellee.

The

Decree also ordered Appellee to hold Appellant harmless on the
home mortgage.

After the Decree was entered, Appellant was

involuntarily discharged from the military and received
"separation pay."

Upon learning of this disbursement, Appellee

made a claim to receive her portion of the disbursement, and

3

Appellant objected and moved to hold Appellee in contempt for
failing to hold Appellant harmless on the home mortgage.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The court below, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding,
entered the decree of divorce on August 16, 1989.

Appellee filed

her Verified Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce and
Motion for Relief on January 4, 1995.
on March 8, 1995.

Appellant filed his Answer

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

were filed on June 9, 1997 along with the Order and Order of
Modification.
June 13, 1997.

Appellant filed his Objection to Proposed Order on
The Notice of Entry of Order was filed on June

16, 1997, and Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on July 9,
1997.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The parties to this action were married on April 20, 1974,
in Manti, Utah.

(Complaint, R. at 1 ) . The parties were divorced

on August 16, 1989.

(Decree of Divorce, R. at 38). Appellee was

awarded physical custody of the parties' four minor children.
(Decree, R. at 39). Appellant was ordered to pay $300.00 per
month per child, for a total of $1,200.00 in child support, to
Appellee.

(Decree, R. at 41). Appellant was also ordered to pay

Appellee $468.00 per month in alimony.

(Decree, R. at 42). The

Decree awarded Appellee ll/40ths of all Appellant's military
retirement benefits.

(Decree, R. at 43). Appellee was also
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ordered to hold Appellant harmless on the mortgage secured by the
marital residence.

(Decree, R. at 44).

In November, 1991, Appellant was involuntarily discharged
from his employment with the United States Navy.
52, Aplt. Exhibit " E " ) .

(Transcript at

Appellant received $30,000.00 in

severance pay in February, 1992.

(Transcript at 52, Aplt.

Exhibit " E " ) .
Subsequent to Appellant's discharge, and after receiving the
$30,000.00 in severance pay, Appellant intentionally refused to
pay his support obligations to Appellee, and by November 25,
1992, Appellant had accrued $7,637.00 in arrearages in family
support.

(Order, R. at 114). Due to Appellant's willful failure

to pay the support and alimony ordered by the court, Appellee was
unable to maintain the mortgage on the house.
210).

(Affidavit, R. at

The house was foreclosed on March 10, 1992.

(Affidavit,

R. at 210). Due to the foreclosure, a debt of $12,469.58 was
established against Appellant.

(Letter, R. at 227). However,

upon Appellant's request, a waiver was granted on December 13,
1993, relieving Appellant of this debt.

(Letter, R. at 227).

Although the debt was waived by the Department of Veterans'
Affairs, Appellant moved for an order to show cause seeking an
order holding Appellee in contempt for failing to hold Appellant
harmless on the mortgage as ordered by the Decree.
at 230).
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(Motion, R.

In the hearing held on this matter on November 7, 1994,
before Commissioner Michael S. Evans, with counsel for both
parties present, the court found that Appellant's failure and
refusal to pay the previously ordered child support and alimony
payments to Appellee was the direct cause of Appellee's inability
to pay the mortgage payments on the real property,

(Minute

Entry, R. at 239, Response, R. at 256). On November 18, 1994,
Appellant filed his objection to Commissioner Evan's
recommendation,

(Objection, R. at 240). On or about January 4,

1995, Appellee filed her Verified Petition for Modification of
Divorce Decree and Motion for Relief.

(Petition, R. at 281).

Appellee's Petition sought to modify child support and asserted
her claim to ll/40ths of the separation pay received by
Appellant.

(Petition, R. at 283) .

On April 17, 1997, these issues came to trial before the
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis.

(Findings, R. at 454).

Judge Lewis

found that Appellant's objection to Commissioner Evans'
recommendation should be denied because Appellee only failed to
make payments on the mortgage after Appellant intentionally
failed to pay his child support and alimony obligations, and the
deficiency owed due to the foreclosure was waived so that
Appellant paid no monies out of pocket due to the foreclosure.
(Findings, R. at 455).

Judge Lewis also found that the

$30,000.00 disbursement made to Appellant when he separated from

6

the Navy was either a marital asset or in anticipation of
retirement and therefore an advance on retirement.

(Findings, R.

at 458). This finding was based on the expert testimony of Neil
B. Crist and because at the time of trial, Appellant's retirement
was fully vested.

(Findings, R. at 457, Transcript at 70 ,

Appellant's Testimony, Aplt. Exhibit

XX

E").

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The parties to this action were married for approximately
fifteen years.

The Divorce Decree awarded Appellee ll/40ths of

Appellant's military retirement benefits.

Upon being

involuntarily separated from the military, Appellant elected to
receive $30,000.00 in separation pay.

At the time of trial,

Appellant had completed twenty years of service in the military.
Therefore, his retirement benefits had vested.
Under 10 U.S.C. §1174, because Appellant elected to receive
separation pay, and because he later reenlisted and earned his
retirement benefits, Appellant must pay back the separation pay
through deductions from his retirement benefits.

Therefore, the

trial court correctly ruled that, because Appellant's retirement
benefits had vested at the time of trial, this separation pay was
an advance on his retirement benefits and Appellee was entitled
to her ll/40ths share.
In addition, the trial court was within its discretion in
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denying Appellant's objection to Commissioner Evan's ruling
restricting Appellant's rights under the Divorce Decree and
denying Appellant's motion to hold Appellee in contempt.

The

Divorce Decree ordered Appellant to pay family support and
Appellee to hold Appellant harmless on a mortgage.

Appellant

intentionally refused to pay the court-ordered family support.
This intentional refusal caused Appellee to be unable to pay the
mortgage payments.

Because Appellee was unable to make the

payments due to Appellant's inequitable conduct, the court was
within its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for contempt.
In addition, the trial court was within its discretion in
restricting Appellant's rights under the Divorce Decree because
"equity refuses to lend its aid to a party whose conduct is
inequitable."
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT APPELLEE WAS
ENTITLED TO 11/4QTHS OF APPELLANT'S SEPARATION PAY.

"Marital property 'encompasses all of the assets of every
nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from
whatever source derived; and this includes any such pension fund
or insurance."

Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah

1988) (quoting Enalert v. Enalert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978)).
Utah's definition of marital property includes deferred
compensation.

See Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1078-79; Woodward v.
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Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-33 (Utah 1982).

"The essential

criterion is whether a right to the benefit has accrued in whole
or in part during the marriage.

To the extent the right has so

accrued it is subject to equitable distribution."

Woodward, 656

P.2d 432-33.
The parties' Divorce Decree awarded Appellee ll/40ths of all
pension and retirement benefits that Appellant may receive.
During the parties' fifteen year marriage, Appellant accrued an
interest in a military pension.

In addition, during the

marriage, Appellant accrued the right to elect to receive
separation pay based on his years of service.

If Appellant

elected to take the separation pay, and in the event that
Appellant would qualify for retirement, 10 U.S.C. §1174(h) would
require that the separation pay amount would be withheld from the
retirement benefits until paid off.
A member who has received separation pay under this
section, or separation pay, severance pay, or readjustment
pay under any other provision of law, based on service in
the armed forces, and who later qualifies for retired or
retainer pay under this title or title 14 shall have
deducted from each payment of such retired or retainer pay
so much of such pay as is based on the service pay under
this section or separation pay, severance pay, or
readjustment pay under any other provision of law until the
total amount deducted is equal to the total amount of
separation pay, severance pay, and readjustment pay
received. 10 U.S.C. §1174(h)(1)(emphasis added).
Appellant did elect to take the separation pay in the amount
of $30,000.00 upon being involuntarily discharged.

The

separation pay was treated as an advance on his retirement by

9

Appellant on his W-2 form and by the IRS.

In addition, Appellant

did qualify for retirement benefits after reenlisting in the
reserve and prior to trial in this matter.

(Transcript at 70,

Appellant's Testimony, Aplt. Exhibit " E " ) .

Therefore, under

§1174, prior to Appellant or Appellee receiving their respective
shares of the retirement benefits, the $30,000.00 would have to
be deducted from the retirement benefits.

This is achieved by

deducting 75% of every payment until the $30,000.00 is repaid.
(Transcript at 42, Aplt. Exhibit " E " ) .
Mr. Crist, the expert witness in this case estimated that
Appellant's retirement benefit would be around $1,800.00 per
month.

(Transcript at 44, Aplt.. Exhibit " E " ) .

Appellee's

ll/40ths share of this would be $495.00 per month.

Because

Appellant elected to take the separation pay, 75% of the
retirement benefits will be withheld until this amount is paid
back.

Therefore, $1,350.00 will be withheld, reducing Appellee's

ll/40ths to $123.75 per month.

This will continue until the

$30,000.00 is paid off, approximately two years.

If Appellee is

not awarded her share of the separation pay, this will have the
effect of causing an enormous hardship and injustice by reducing
Appellee's share of the retirement benefits and keeping Appellee
from being made whole, as well as requiring Appellee to pay back
ll/40ths of the $30,000.00 for Appellant.
Appellant argues that military retirement pay and separation

10

pay are not related and must be handled separately because
"someone who receives the separation payment will not necessarily
receive retirement."

However, in the present case, Appellant, at

the time of trial, had qualified for retirement.
70, Appellant's Testimony, Aplt. Exhibit " E " ) .
Appellant will receive retirement benefits.

(Transcript at
Therefore,

In addition, because

Appellant qualified for retirement benefits, these benefits are
substantially related to the separation pay under §1174(h).

Once

Appellant qualified for retirement benefits, the separation pay
became an advance on retirement under §1174, which would have to
be repaid through deductions from the retirement benefits.
Appellant also argues that while Utah does not have any case
law concerning separation pay, the California case of Kuzmiak "is
precisely on point."

Kuzmiak v. Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. 644

(Cal. App. 2d 1986), cert, denied 479 U.S. 885 (1986).

However,

in Kuzmiak, at the time of trial, the husband was not entitled to
retirement benefits because he had not completed his 20 years of
service.

Id. at 645.

In our case, Appellant was entitled to

retirement benefits at the time of trial.
While the Kuzmiak case did not directly concern this issue,
the California case did discuss the possibility of someone who
took a separation pay and then reenlisted and subsequently earned
retirement benefits.
If a member reenlists after involuntary discharge and
subsequently receives a longevity pension after serving 20
11

years, the purposes of the separation pay have not been
fulfilled. Subdivision (h)(1) of section 1174 recognizes
this by compelling reimbursement of separation pay from the
members retirement payments. There is no reason for
finding separation pay to be the member's separate property
once the member reenlists and earns a longevity pension.
Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 647 (emphasis added).
This is exactly what happened in the present case.
elected to take his separation pay.
retirement benefits.

Appellant

He reenlisted. He earned his

Therefore, under the Kuzmiak reasoning,

there is no reason for finding Appellant's separation pay to be
Appellant's separate property.
Appellant argues that the Kuzmiak court "concluded" that
separation pay is the separate property of the service member.
However, while this may be true for service members who have not
qualified for retirement yet, this is a misstatement of the
"conclusion" of the Kuzmiak court.

The Kuzmaik conclusion is

clearly stated on page 648 of the decision.

It states:

For these reasons, we conclude that wife has a community
property interest in husband's longevity pension, including
the $30,000 separation pay the government will withhold
from his retirement benefits. This holding recognizes the
separate property characteristic of the separation pay
(until husband's actions in reenlisting and earning a
longevity pension) and also protects wife's rights to a
community property asset. Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 648
(emphasis added).
Therefore, the Kuzmiak holding supports the trial court in the
present case that if the service member reenlists and earns
retirement benefits, the separation pay becomes an advance on the
retirement benefits under §1174, and as such, Appellee is
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entitled to her ll/40ths share of the separation pay.
While separation pay is generally separate property, once a
service member, such as Appellant, reenlists and earns a
retirement benefit, the separation pay becomes an advance on the
retirement benefits as held by the trial court and Kuzmiak, and
must be repaid through retirement pay deductions under §1174.
Retirement benefits are marital property subject to distribution
under Woodward.

Appellee was awarded ll/40ths of Appellant's

retirement benefits by the Divorce Decree.

Therefore, the trial

court correctly awarded Appellee ll/40ths of the separation pay
as "an advance on retirement pay . . . accrued during marriage."
(Transcript at 97, Aplt. Exhibit " E " ) .

A.

UNDER §1174 APPELLEE WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE
REPAYMENT OF THE SEPARATION PAY.

Appellant next argues that if Appellee is awarded ll/40ths
of the separation pay, she should have to participate in the
repayment.

This is already provided for by 10 U.S.C. §1174.

As

stated above, because Appellant elected to receive separation pay
and then reenlisted and qualified for retirement benefits, the
separation pay will be repaid through deductions from the
retirement benefits.

Thus, 75% of the retirement pay is withheld

until the $30,000.00 is repaid.

Therefore, if the retirement

benefit is $1,800.00, $1,350.00 will be withheld.

During the

repayment time, Appellee will receive $123.75 and Appellant will
13

receive $326.25.

Had Appellant not elected to receive the

separation pay, Appellee would have received $495.00 per month
while Appellant would have received $1305.00 per month.
Therefore, during the repayment time, Appellee is repaying
$371.25 ($495.00 - $123.75) per month, which is exactly ll/40ths
of $1,350.00 ($371.25 / $1,350.00), the entire repayment amount
per month.

Therefore, once the retirement benefits begin to be

paid out, Appellee will repay her ll/40ths share of the
separation pay thereby making both parties whole.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
REFUSING TO HOLD APPELLEE IN CONTEMPT WHERE APPELLANT
INTENTIONALLY REFUSED TO PAY COURT-ORDERED SUPPORT TO
APPELLEE CAUSING HER INABILITY TO MAKE PAYMENTS ON THE
MORTGAGE.

"It is generally accepted that the issuance of an order
relating to contempt of court is discretionary with the trial
judge."

Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993)

(citing Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah
1976) .

"To find contempt, the court must find from clear and

convincing proof that the contemnor knew what was required, had
the ability to comply, and willfully and knowingly failed and
refused to do so."

Id. (citing Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d

1162, 1172 (Utah 1988))(emphasis added).
The Decree of Divorce awarded child support and alimony to
Appellee.

The Decree also ordered Appellee to hold Appellant

14

harmless on the mortgage secured by the parties' marital
residence.

Appellant intentionally1 refused to pay his court

ordered family support, thereby causing extreme hardship on
Appellee and the parties' four children.

By November, 1992,

Appellant was $7,637.00 in arrears.
During the period when Appellant refused to pay his family
support obligations, and as a result of Appellant's refusal,
Appellee could not keep the mortgage on the home current.
(Affidavit, R. at 210). As a result of Appellee's inability to
make the payments and due to Appellant's refusal to pay his
ordered support obligations, the home was foreclosed.

However,

on December 13, 1993, by Appellant's request, the outstanding
debt on the home was waived by the Veteren's Administration so
that Appellant would not have to pay anything on the loan
deficiency.

(Letter, R. at 227). The trial court found that

because Appellee's inability to pay the mortgage payments was a
direct result of Appellant's intentional refusal to pay his
family support obligations and because the deficiency owed was
also waived, Appellee was not in contempt.

Clearly such a ruling

was within the trial court's discretion since the trial court
determined that Appellee was unable to make the payments due to
Appellant's intentional refusal to pay his support obligations.

1

Besides Appellant's other substantial sources of income,
Appellant received $30,000.00 in separation pay in February of
1992 and therefore could have met his support obligations.
15

Appellant also argues that "[t]he obligations of the Divorce
Decree are separate obligations and should be treated as such."
He then cites cases where the court held that generally
visitation could not be denied merely because child support
obligations had not been paid.

However, visitation issues are

only concerned with the best interests of the children.
Appellant has not alleged that Appellee has denied Appellant any
visitation rights.
Appellant claims that the Rohr court "concluded that

Ma]

court may not deny the noncustodial parent visitation rights for
the mere

failure to pay child support, where the failure to pay

is due to an inability to pay.'" (Aplt.. Brief quoting Rohr v.
Rohr, 709 P.2d 382, 383 (Utah 1985)).
"conclusion" of the Rohr court.

However, this was not the

The court actually held that

because Mr. Rohr intentionally and willfully refused to pay child
support and intentionally failed to abide by the court-ordered
visitation schedule, the trial court properly
visitation rights.

restricted his

Id. at 384.

This is the same as the present case where Appellant
intentionally refused to pay his family support obligations, and
as a result, the trial court properly restricted his rights under
the divorce decree.

The Rohr holding was based on the general

principle that "equity refuses to lend its aid to a party whose
conduct is inequitable."

Id. (citing Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d
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102, 107 (Utah 1984)(stating that "he who seeks equity must do
equity"); Barbour v. Barbour, 330 P.2d 1093 (Mont. 1958); see
also Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah App. 1989)).
Therefore, because Appellee's inability to pay the mortgage
was due to Appellant's inequitable conduct, the trial court was
clearly within its discretion in denying Appellant's objection to
Commissioner Evan's ruling.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, this Court
should affirm the trial court's ruling, with costs awarded to
Appellee as allowed by Rule 34 of the

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE .

RESPECTFULLY submitted this

fO

day of July, 1998.

CORPORON Sc WILLIAMS, P.C,

,LIE F. WILLIAMS.
:torney for Appellee
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